Andrews University

Digital Commons @ Andrews University
Honors Theses

Undergraduate Research

2012

Inter-group Communication During Hurricane Katrina: How
Organizational Culture Defeats Coordination
Johanna Nielsen

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/honors

Recommended Citation
Nielsen, Johanna, "Inter-group Communication During Hurricane Katrina: How Organizational Culture
Defeats Coordination" (2012). Honors Theses. 54.
https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/honors/54

This Honors Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Undergraduate Research at Digital Commons
@ Andrews University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of
Digital Commons @ Andrews University. For more information, please contact repository@andrews.edu.

Thank you for your interest in the

Andrews University Digital Library

Please honor the copyright of this document by
not duplicating or distributing additional copies
in any form without the author’s express written
permission. Thanks for your cooperation.

John Nevins Andrews Scholars
Andrews University Honors Program
Honors Thesis

Inter-group communication during Hurricane Katrina:
How organizational culture defeats coordination

Johanna Nielsen
2 April 2012

Advisor: Dr. Delyse Steyn
Department: Communication

Abstract
Interaction between groups can be understood as regulated by two Communication
theories: Adaptive Structuration theory which describes how a group’s resources affect how it
solves problems, and Functional Group Decision Making Theory which describes the steps
groups take to make decisions. When combined into a model, these theories provide a framework
for examining how groups use resources in their interaction with each other. Research into both
secondary and primary sources identified ten resources groups used to interact with other groups
during the crisis response. Careful analysis determined that the Federal, State, and Private
agencies’ organizational cultures and social identities were resources that the agencies did not
manage well which in turn led to poor coordination.

Background
On Friday, August 26, 2005, Hurricane Katrina struck Florida as a Category 1 hurricane,
turned into the Gulf of Mexico, and began “rapidly strengthening” to a Category 4 hurricane
(winds reaching 145 mph) according to the National hurricane Center ("Katrina: What happened
when," 2005). Louisiana Governor Blanco declared a state of emergency. The next day (2 days
prior to landfall in Louisiana), Governor Blanco asked President Bush to authorize FEMA to
coordinate disaster relief. He did so. The Director of the National Hurricane Center, Max
Mayfield, called the governors of Mississippi and Louisiana personally to impress upon them the
seriousness of the potential devastation. The next day he called the President as well to warn him
of the severity of the storm ("Katrina: What happened when," 2005).
At 20 hours before land fall Sunday morning, New Orleans mayor Ray Nagin, ordered a
mandatory evacuation of the city. Researchers had previously determined it would take about
twice that amount of time to evacuate the city. The National Hurricane Center predicted storm
surges would overtop most levees1. At 8:30pm an empty Amtrak train left New Orleans with
room for hundreds of passengers. An Amtrak spokesperson stated that the city had declined their
offer to help evacuate. Mayor Nagin claimed he never received that offer ("A timeline of
government response...," 2005)
On Monday, August 29, 2005 at 6am, Hurricane Katrina made landfall off the coast of
Louisiana “massively” overtopping levees ("Katrina: What happened when," 2005). A whole day
later, the city will discover that the levees protecting New Orleans from Lake Pontchartrain had
1

New Orleans is below the sea level which means it has walls or levees to keep the tides from flooding the city.
Storm surges are when the unusually high winds push the sea water over the land. If the extra water is higher than
the levees, then New Orleans floods. And since New Orleans is situated like a bowl with no outlet, it can take a
long time for flood waters to disperse; in most cases, the city has to pump the water out to speed recovery.

collapsed sending a slower wave of flooding into the city. (The Army Corps of Engineers are
only able to repair them one week later). At least 80% of the city flooded putting survivors at
risk for e. coli and other harmful bacteria. Thousands of survivors were trapped on rooftops
while more flocked to the Superdome. The Superdome rapidly became unlivable as human waste
piled up, temperatures reached the high 90s causing severe dehydration, and survivors began
dying without their medication. Looting crippled rescue efforts as the city’s diminished police
force turned to controlling law breakers. At one point, a sniper shot at doctors and patients from
a rooftop as they tried to evacuate Charity Hospital ("Katrina: What happened when," 2005).
The next several days were characterized by a flurry of miscommunication. Governor
Blanco begged the President for more aid. The President assured her it’s coming, but it never
did. Meanwhile, the National Guard wondered why no one was asking for its help to rescue
stranded survivors or to control looting. FEMA assumed responsibility of evacuating the
Superdome, but it took several days. Thousands of buses were lost en route. ("A timeline of
government response...," 2005)
Months later Frances Townsend in his report for the White House stated that though
Hurricane Katrina was larger and more severe than expected, the greatest problem was poor
communication between different Federal, State, and Private agencies. (Townsend, 2011)

Introduction
Experts in the Emergency Management field—including Jim Hatfield et. al, Naim
Kapucu, Frances Townsend, and Jim McKay—agree that inter-group coordination (two or more
groups working together) is key to a successful emergency response. However, evidence
suggests that despite growing ease of communication (Yates, 2011), social or [organizational]

cultural issues impede communication between groups (McKay, 2010).2. According to Rama
Joshi (2001), writing for the Indian Journal of Industrial Relations, organizational culture is the
“…the prevailing roles, relationships, beliefs, norms, values, attitudes, skills, etc. pertaining to
work. It takes time to develop and…is resistant to change” (p. 19, 20).3 Organizational culture is
what makes groups distinctive, provides direction, affects perception, and guides action.
A useful way of looking at organizational cultures is the Social Identity Theory.
According to Blake Ashforth and Fred Mael (1989), Social Identity Theory states that “people
tend to classify themselves and others into various social categories, such as organizational
membership, religious affiliation, gender, and age cohort.” (p. 20). People tend to hold more than
one social identity and transfer from one to another depending on their context. For instance, a
woman who identifies as both a mother and as a business executive will change her behavior
depending on whether she’s at home or in a meeting.
Group behavior can be further understood as the interaction of the Adaptive Structuration
Theory and the Functional Group Decision Making Theory. Working together, these theories
provide a framework that we can use to organize our approach to inter-group dynamics. The first
theory, Adaptive Structuration Theory, explains how groups’ rules, resources, and internal
structure influence each other. According to Marshall Scott Poole et al. (1985), groups’
structures make and remake groups’ systems while the system, in turn, determines the structure.
Systems are the “‘regularized relations of interdependence between individuals and groups.’ For
example, the status hierarchy of a group or organization can be regarded as a…system” (p. 76).
2

Neither “culture” nor “social” is referencing ethnicity, geography, or race. While ethnicity and racial issues are
often important to communication practices, this is not my area of interest. Because organizations in America tend
to be highly heterogeneous in regards to issues like race, age, and gender, these issues will not be relevant to this
discussion.
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Groups and agencies, in this context, are a collection of people with explicitly defined barriers and the same goal
or task—like a corporation or charity organization.

In other words, a system is a Network of people with different roles, in a hierarchy, who
communicate with each other. A structure, Poole defines as “...the rules and resources people use
in interaction” (p. 76). Rules can be either explicit (we follow Company Policy when speaking to
customers) or implicit (don’t interrupt the boss when his door is closed). Resources are anything
a group uses to function and make decisions. They can include different kinds of information,
abilities, people or experts, and tangibles like radios, money, roads, etc. We could chart the
different elements of groups like this:
Adaptive Structuration Model

Structure

Rules

System
(network)

Resources

Figure 1
Social Identity, as it relates to organizations, is also an adaptive-structuring entity—meaning, it
creates and is recreated like the Adaptive Structuration Theory describes.
The second theory, the Functional Group Decision Making Theory (FGDMT) outlines
how groups use their Structure (especially their resources) to make good decisions. The
following graph from First Look at Communication Theory by Emory Griffin (2003) shows the
different steps:

FGDM Model
Goal Setting
Evaluation of
Solutions’
pros/cons

Problem
Analysis
Identification
of Alternative
Solutions

Decision/
Action

Figure 2
First, groups use their resources to analyze the problem, then they set goals and identify
alternative solutions, and finally, they evaluate the pros and cons of each alternative and take
action. When groups fail to perform each the tasks at each step carefully, they tend to make bad
decisions.
If we were to combine these two models (calling the new hybrid: AS/FGDMT Model), it
might look like this:

Resources

AS/FGDMT
Model

Decision/
Action

Figure 3
Groups input their various resources, including information about member status, roles, and
hierarchies, information about the task to be performed, a working memory of similar tasks,
networks, training, and physical resources (which I call tangibles) like radios, money, internet,

etc. into this AS/FGDMT Model. The Model then outputs a decision or action4. If the groups use
the wrong resources to help them make a decision or take action, their decisions and actions tend
to be bad. The results can be inefficiency, slow reaction-times, and poor information
management. These sorts of results make it very difficult for groups to coordinate their response,
much like what we saw after Hurricane Katrina.

Methodology
I chose three agencies to act as representatives of the three spheres of influence in New
Orleans, Louisiana during the response to Hurricane Katrina: the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) to represent the Federal Government, Governor Blanco’s office to
represent Louisiana State (the State), and the American Red Cross (Red Cross) to represent
private volunteers.
I chose one self-report for each agency ranging from four to seven pages. To gain some
perspective and offset some of the self-reporting bias, I also chose four third-party sources
ranging from one and a half pages to twelve. Information on all three agencies was tallied in the
third-party sources. Information about other agencies besides these three agencies was ignored in
all sources.
As I read though the seven texts, I tallied the themes that occurred the most often. I used
those for coding. The assumption being that groups would write about the things that they were
most preoccupied with and they would be most preoccupied with things that were a barrier. I
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I by no means intend to propose that this is instantaneous. The AS theory is an ongoing process. Like individuals,
groups can (and perhaps often do) use mental shortcuts when processing information in the moment. The AS
process helps to prepare the group’s responses to future stimuli.

identified ten themes that were relevant to FEMA’s, the Red Cross’s, and the Louisiana State’s
discussion of the issues involved in responding to Hurricane Katrina.
Both successful attempts and failures were counted. Sometimes more than one theme was
counted per sentence. Below is a table of definitions for each of the themes.
Table 1
Theme Title

Description

Hierarchy/Authority

A resource a group uses to organize their structure. Describes
communication failures in a chain of command. This theme is expressed
either internally or between agencies—for example, there was political
maneuvering to place Louisiana under the authority of the federal
government.

Roles

A resource a group uses to determine members’ functions during a
crisis. Unclear role definition leads to confusion and miscoordination.

Plans/Prep/Training

Describes pre-crisis planning, training, or preparation which becomes a
resource groups’ rely on to make good decisions and act quickly during
a crisis

Discernables_Unused

This theme was tallied whenever an example of unused tangibles or
information was mentioned or when a rejected offer of help was
mentioned.

Discernables_Not

This theme was tallied whenever an agency complained of insufficient

Enough

tangibles or information (like situational awareness) to effectively and
quickly mitigate the crisis.

Networks_External

This theme was tallied whenever an example of interagency

communication or coordination (whether successful or not) was given.
Networks_Internal

This theme was tallied whenever an example of intra-agency
communication was given.

Networks_Operability This theme was tallied whenever an example of the failures of
communication tangibles was given. This included when agencies
couldn’t enter New Orleans due to the flooded roads, or when agencies
didn’t have electricity or internet connection.
Security/Safety

This is a resource for groups since group members can’t function
optimally in an unsafe environment. For instance, rescue volunteers
could not operate until the violent looters were handled.

Act Faster/Inefficiency This theme was tallied whenever an agency expressed frustration with
how slowly or how inefficiently they or another agency acted. For
instance, FEMA described their response as “bureaucratic”.

These are the coding definitions of the themes. When these themes are applied to groupdynamics, they have more complex definitions as will be described later.

Results
External Sources

Figure 4
In the Washington Post article, the greatest reported theme for both FEMA and Louisianna State
(LA State) was Networks_External at 22 occurrences each. The greatest theme concerning the
Red Cross was Discernables_Unused and Discernables_Not Enough at one mention each. The
Red Cross is not mentioned further in this article. Secondary themes for FEMA included
Inefficiency (13 occurrences to LA state’s 1) and Discernables_Not Enough (10 occurrences).
Hierarchy and Preparation tied with 8 occurrences. Louisiana State’s secondary themes included
a high emphasis on Discernables_Not Enough (19 occurrences to FEMA’s 10), and lesser
emphasis on Plans/Prep/Training (8 occurrences).

Figure 5
The Time magazine article did not mention the Networks_Internal or Networks_Operability
themes and did not mention the Red Cross at all. The most frequent theme discussed was
Networks_External for Louisiana State mentioned 12 times to FEMA’s 2 times. FEMA’s most
frequent theme was Discernables_Unused (5 occurrences). Louisiana’s secondary themes include
Hierarchy/Authority (5 occurrences), and Roles, Discernables_Not Enough, and Inefficiency (4
occurrences each). FEMA’s secondary themes included Hierarchy/Authority (4 occurrences) and
Roles, Plans/Prep/Training, and Inefficiency (3 occurrences each).

Figure 6
The US Government Accountability Office’s (GAO’s) report spoke exclusively on the Red
Cross. The report did not mention Discernables_Unused. The theme occurring most frequently
was Networks_External, mentioned 10 times in a 4 page paper. The Red Cross’s secondary
themes included Plans/Prep/Training and Networks_Operability (5 occurrences each) and Roles
and Inefficiency (4 occurrences each). The least frequently discussed theme was
Networks_Internal.

Figure 7
This 1.5 page report did not mention FEMA or Louisiana State at all. It occurrences three themes
in relation to the Red Cross: Networks_External (3 occurrences), Discernables_Unused (2
occurrences), and Hierarchy/Authority (1 occurence).

Internal Sources

Figure 8
The FEMA’s self-report was most concerned with Networks_External (31 occurrences). It’s
secondary themes included Discernables_Not Enough (24 occurrences) and Plans/Prep/Training
(22 occurrences). The report was least concerned with Networks_Internal (0 occurrences) and
Security/Safety (1 occurrence).

Figure 9
Louisiana State’s self report was most concerned with Networks_External (23 occurrences) and
Plans/Prep/Training (22 occurrences). The report’s secondary themes included Roles (18
occurrences), and Hierarchy/Authority (14 occurrences). The report was least concerned with
Discernables_Unused, Networks_Internal, Inefficiency (4 occurrences each), and Security/Safety
(3 occurrences).

Figure 10
The American Red Cross’s self report was most concerned with Networks_External (17
occurrences. The report’s secondary themes included Discernables_Not Enough (13 occurrences)
and Hierarchy/Authority (11 occurrences). The report was least concerned with Security/Safety
and Inefficiency (3 occurrences each) and Discernables_Unused (2 occurrences). The report did
not mention the themes Networks_Intenral or Networks_Operability at all.

Discussion
As I read through the texts I found ten themes that occurred consistently. All ten of them
seem to be associated with the Adaptive Structuration Theory (Figure 1 and Table 1). Three of
those seem to be related to Poole’s (1985) definition of Structure: Hierarchy/Authority, Roles,
and Networks_Internal (Table 1). The rest appear to be related to Adaptive Structuration’s

Resources: Plans/Prep/Training, Discernables (Unused and Not enough), Networks (External and
Operability), Security/Safety, and Act Faster/Inefficiency (Table 1).
The theme that occurred the most frequently in nearly all of the texts was
Networks_External (Figures 4-10) indicating that each agency and each external source was
highly concerned with the quality of communication between agencies. The relatively low
concern about Internal and Operability portions of the Communication Networks might be due to
the steps agencies took to bolster these parts of their Networks after 9/11. Likewise, though these
agencies work in very uncertain and often threatening environments agencies might be counterintuitively unconcerned with Security/Safety because they might feel confident in their agency’s
ability to protect them with a well-tested structure (rules, training, resources, etc).
The secondary themes that garnered the most attention (Hierarchy/Authority, Roles, and
Plans/Prep/Training) can be thought of as resources or structure that contributes to the agencies’
organizational culture. Hierarchy and Authority5 creates the foundation and structure for the
group—the skeleton. Roles give a direction and a standard operating procedure (SOP) for
performing tasks. In an emergency response context, agencies tend to define themselves via
Roles. Therefore, besides providing direction and SOP, Roles provide the group with a valuable
sense of identity and purpose. Plans/Prep/Training reveal the values and forethought of the
group. What the group values, they will take steps to protect with planning and training (closely
related to Roles). What the group values affects organizational culture. For instance, a group that
values children will prepare differently and behave differently from a group that values small
businesses. The fact that so many of these pieces of organizational culture showed up as themes

5

including unofficial power and status hierarchies as well as officially described supervisor-worker relationships

in the texts suggest that a central concern for the writers was the organizational culture of each
agency demonstrated by their attitudes and behavior.
Although it wasn’t mentioned as frequently, Internal Networks is another critical piece of
organizational culture. Internal Networks are what you say, how you say it, and who you say it
to6. It also includes a memory of previous transactions and a knowledge database of who knows
what. The Internal Network is especially critical for developing organizational culture because it
creates a transactional climate (what it feels like to talk to others, i.e. supportive, defensive, open,
unwelcome, etc.). Furthermore, the Internal Network carries the memory of the organizational
culture. Every time a member speaks, what they say and how they say it reveals the
organizational culture and recreates it for the listener. In this way, organizational culture carried
by the Internal Network could be described as an adaptive-structuring entity (meaning it acts the
same way that the Adaptive Structuration Theory describes: creating and being recreated). It was
said before that this theme might not have been of great concern because groups had taken steps
to address it after 9/11. However, groups’ behavior, decisions, and External Communication
develop out of the organizational culture advanced by the Internal Network. It is possible that
the difficulties groups have had in External Communications are in actuality chronic problems in
their Internal Communications.
Besides organizational culture, the Internal Networks might influence groups’ Social
Identities. As was stated before, Social Identity Theory is also an adaptive-structuring entity.
Ashforth & Mael (1989) state, “Identification [with the organization] also may engender
internalization of, and adherence to, group values and norms and homogeneity in attitudes and
behavior.” (26). Meaning, individuals who enter the organization partially imbibe the
6

While analyzing documents, I only counted instances of communication between members of a group. However,
Internal Networks are composed of more than just instances of communication.

organizational culture making it a part of (or one of) their social identities. I submit that they
“internalize” this culture through interaction with the Internal Network.7 Then, individuals use
their social identities to recreate the organizational culture. “It is likely that social identification
will reinforce…the distinctiveness of the group’s values and practices, group prestige, salience of
and competition with out-groups…” (Ashforth & Mael, 1989, p. 26). “Salience of out-groups” is
a process by which the perception of other groups makes your group band together more closely.
This can have important implications for how groups cooperate. If your group identity is being
challenged8 by outside groups, it might be psychologically hard for your group to act
altruistically or even cooperatively with those outside groups.
It is possible to see an example of this in the treatment of the American Red Cross by the
media (Figures 4-7) and the subsequent treatment of the Red Cross by FEMA. The media never
significantly mentioned the American Red Cross with either FEMA or Louisiana State. It
appears as if the media treats the two government agencies and the Red Cross (a private agency)
as “out-groups9”. Social identity is built by what your group says about you and simultaneously
built by what others say about your group. It’s logical that the media’s categorical separation of
government and private agencies correlates with how those agencies see themselves.
If this is true, then FEMA’s underuse of the Red Cross takes on a new light. According to
the CNN article ("Red Cross: State rebuffed relief efforts," 2005), the American Red Cross
asked FEMA (as per standard operating procedure) on September 1 whether it could enter New
Orleans to begin the relief effort at the Superdome. FEMA requested that the Red Cross wait 24
7

What and how you say things provides information about your organizational culture. (Maybe I discourage you
from taking that new idea to the boss because ‘that’s not how we do things here’). New comers learn about the
organizational culture via interaction with the Internal Network.
8
Perhaps just by the virtue of being there. Not necessarily a conscious threat.
9
An “in-group” is “us”; an “out-group” is “them”. So the media is treating the government agencies and the private
agencies as if they don’t belong together in a “them” vs. “them” paradigm.

hours for a place to be set up for them. But 24 hours later, FEMA had already ordered the
evacuation of the Superdome and told the Red Cross that “…they felt they had adequate supplies
there to take care of it without (the Red Cross)…” ("Red Cross: State rebuffed relief efforts,"
2005). However, the FEMA self-report later states that Discernables_Not Enough was the second
highest concern (Figure 8). Clearly, FEMA was uncertain about whether or not it needed help. I
propose that because FEMA did not recognize the Red Cross as an in-group, it did not take into
account the Red Cross’s resources. Or in other words, FEMA’s social identity did not include the
Red Cross as a collaborator therefore FEMA did not input the Red Cross’s resources into the
AS/FGDMT model (Figure 3) which resulted in further poor decisions and miscoordination.

Recommendations
It seems clear that organizational culture and social identity is a critical influence on a
group’s internal structure and external behavior. Although the scope of this study did not include
an accurate description of each of the agency’s organizational cultures or social identities, it can
to some degree describe an organizational culture that may lead to better cooperation. Rama
Joshi (2001) describes how management can influence organizational culture.
Organizations where the members feel that management is “holding back” information or
they don’t “tell us what is going on” tend to be characterized by suspicion, rumour,
distortion and mistrust of management. Such an organization will not be capable of
generating a culture characterized by high levels of commitment and/or performance.
Developing good communications is, therefore, essential in order to generate trust,
cooperation, commitment and feeling of belonging. (p. 24)

That “commitment and feeling of belonging” is very much like what Social Identity Theory
describes. Joshi believes that good Internal Communication—one that promotes a trustworthy
hierarchy—is essential for commitment to the group’s goals, performance, and, perhaps by
extension, cooperation between groups. Groups should reinforce a culture of transparent
management to garner membership trust, loyalty, and cooperation.
One way to encourage this sort of transparent management is to create what Joshi (2001)
describes as a “flat structure”, “It is believed and also proved by experience that flat structures
with low hierarchies encourage communication and clearer definitions of responsibility.” (p. 22).
This means that groups with members with mostly equal statuses (or low “power distances”)
tend to communicate better and have a clearer definition of Roles. As was stated earlier, both
Louisiana State and the Red Cross (Figures 9, 10) struggled with Role definition. Perhaps easing
the power distance among members in a hierarchy is one way to encourage greater Role
definition. A clearer definition of Roles also positively influences members’ social identities
which Joshi said generated cooperation.
Another area that seemed to be critical to this research was Internal Networks. I stated
before that Internal Networks both carry the organizational culture and create a transactional
atmosphere (what it’s like to talk to people). If this is so, then developing a cooperative
atmosphere seems like an important first step in interfacing with other groups. Agencies (if they
haven’t already) may need to develop an organizational culture that expects to and values
working with other organizations in a crisis10. This culture might value a more permeable group
boundary allowing frequent turnover of membership. A more permeable group boundary would
also allow easier temporary incorporation of people with out-group social identities into the in-

10

Remember FEMA and the American Red Cross

group’s activities11. This culture might also have a higher tolerance for chaos and anxiety
(making it easier to interact effectively with strangers and foreign organizational cultures). It
might value diversity and innovation allowing the group to quickly incorporate new perspectives
into the decision-making process. This list could be expanded to any number of qualities.
Joshi (2001) cautions, however, that “A new culture cannot be developed in any simple
way in organizations that are already in existence and have evolved a way of life.” (p. 22).
Individuals tend to be extremely resistant to change; organizations more so. It can be very
difficult and take several membership turnovers to affect a lasting and substantial change in
organizational culture12. However, I think it is worth the effort.
Issues of communication are unavoidably complex and thus require more than one
research perspective. My argument depends in large part on organizational culture, but I was
unable to do the research necessary to accurately describe each agency’s culture. Knowing what
sort of culture each agency had would allow researchers to corroborate or dismiss my hypothesis.
Another question worth pursuing is how organizational cultures affect information
management. The ways agency’s collect, analyze, distribute, and archive information affects the
quality of their decisions. It may be that that organizational culture can act as a top-down
influencer of information management. There is already well established research describing
how important information management is to quality decision making and how stress affects
communication channels. Hari Das (1980) states,
“Other writers have also noted that when individuals work under great stress, certain
pathologies may arise in the decision processes which reduce the overall quality of the

11

For instance, an agency might need to listen to an expert who is part of an out-group. An agency with more
permeable boundaries would have an easier time temporarily including that expert in group activities.
12
This is one reason things like prejudice and racial stereotyping take so long to die out.

decision. Severe crisis is also likely to make creative problem-solving very unlikely, as
the decision-makers become increasingly focused on fire-fighting. The available evidence
thus seems to suggest that under severe crisis situations, decision-makers are less likely to
perceive all relevant information, perceive the information less accurately, and consider
fewer alternative courses of action available to them.” (p. 183-184)
He further describes how there is a tendency to reduce the number of communication channels
during a crisis. This combined with short reaction times can lead to poor decisions like what we
saw during Hurricane Katrina. (Das 1980, 185)
There are certainly many avenues of study in both the fields of Emergency Management
and Group Dynamics. However, we should not let the issues of inter-group communications lie
dormant until the next disaster strikes. At the time of this writing, the Gulf Coast is entering
another hurricane season with unseasonably warm waters which have already led to more
tornadoes than usual in Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee and may lead to harsher Hurricane
Katrina-like storms. The time to develop relationships with other agencies and prepare
Communication Networks is now, when nature is peaceful. Not doing so could cost the lives of
victims.
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